UVALDE, Texas — When law enforcement responds to an incident, whether it is a shooting or a car wreck, there are rules for deciding who is in charge of the scene.
According to Texas Police Chief Association President Jimmy Perdue, responsibility starts with the first officer on scene and proceeds from there.
"Typically what happens is the first officer on scene is in charge until he is relieved by someone who is above him. Either a sergeant or lieutenant that shows up. That progression continues as the situation of the scene unfolds," Perdue said. "It's his or her call to manage it until they are relieved by someone else."
When there are multiple agencies, Perdue said, the responsibility goes to the agency primarily responsible for that location until they relinquish control to someone else. When something happens at a school district, and that school district has a chief of police, Perdue said the protocols are clear.
"Following the normal protocols, and the way we evaluate the situation, if the chief of police of a school district is on scene at an event, then yes, it is on his jurisdiction, his turf. That chief is going to be the primary commander over that incident," Perdue said.
According to a Texas House of Representatives investigative committee report on the Robb Elementary school shooting, many officers on scene believed the scene commander was Uvalde CISD Police Chief Pete Arredondo, who arrived on scene soon after the shooter.
Unfortunately, that's not how Arredondo saw it.
According the the report, Arredondo told state representatives the following in a June 21 committee hearing:
"[W]hile you’re in there, you don’t title yourself … I know our policy states you’re the incident commander. My approach and thought was responding as a police officer. And so I didn’t title myself. But once I got in there and we took that fire, back then, I realized, we need some things. We’ve got to get in that door. We need an extraction tool. We need those keys. As far as … I’m talking about the command part … the people that went in, there was a big group of them outside that door. I have no idea who they were and how they walked in or anything. I kind of – I wasn’t given that direction," Arredondo said.
That lack of direction led to a communications stalemate.
Arredondo entered the school building though the south door and stayed in a hallway south of the shooter.
The United States Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) arrived on scene in the north portion of the hallway, and additional officers were on both sides.
The report says "some newly arrived responders" appeared to suggest that the officers in the south part of the hallway, including Arredondo, clear out and reposition to avoid a crossfire. Uvalde Police officer, Sgt. Daniel Coronado told them “Chief is in there, Chief is in charge right now,” according to the report.
Perdue said it would be completely logical for Coronado to believe Arredondo was in charge at the time. Unfortunately, Arredondo did not make direct communication with the BORTAC team and law enforcement officers were stuck in a dangerous situation facing each other.
"If the shooter decided he was going to come outside the room and engage the first officer that was there, there would have been a significant crossfire where the officers could have injured each other by shooting down the hallway at each other," Perdue said.
The report also stated that Special Agent Luke Williams of the Department of Public Safety interred the building and approached the north area of the hallway where other Uvalde officers were positioned. The report said Williams stated, “if there’s kids in there we need to go in there.”
The report then said, "An officer who had been positioned in the hallway responded to Special Agent Williams that whoever was in charge would figure that out."
Again, Arredondo did not put himself in charge. Perdue said the scene commander should, in this situation, establish an incident command with representatives from all agencies present so they could coordinate. Arredondo didn't do this and the report shows there was little to no coordination between law enforcement in the north part of the hallway and the south part of the hallway.
The report states," Chief Arredondo testified that the only direction he gave to the north side of the building, through Constable Field, was for them to evacuate the kids and to test the keys before trying to go into the room with the attacker. He said he did not make any decision for BORTAC to breach the classrooms."
Eventually, BORTAC Acting Commander Paul Guerrero decided to take command of the situation in the north part of the hallway. Guerrero obtained a rifle-rate shield (the only shield present that would be effective against the shooter) and obtained a master key from an officer at the scene. He then organized a stack of officers to breach the classroom and eliminate the shooter.
The report indicates there was little to no communication between the BORTAC team and Arredondo: "Chief Arredondo did not actually exercise tactical incident command over the BORTAC team, nor did the BORTAC team seek instruction from Chief Arredondo," states the report.
The BORTAC team was also on the scene later than Arredondo and other officers from the Uvalde school district and Uvalde Police Department.
Perdue said the officers who initially responded had an obligation to organize themselves and shot the shooter instead of waiting.
"When the officers went in the room, went in the hallway initially, and went to the room, they were following the normal protocols. When they met with gunfire though the door they retreated, which is a natural reaction," Perdue said. "What should have happened at that point, is that you regroup, reassess, and re-engage. You go back in until you can eliminate the threat."
The report also states that Arredondo's actions were contrary to police training. It states, "ALERRT training teaches that any law enforcement officer can assume command, that somebody must assume command, and that an incident commander can transfer responsibility as an incident develops. That did not happen at Robb Elementary, and the lack of effective incident command is a major factor that caused other vital measures to be left undone. Also, the misinformation reported to officers on the outside likely prevented some of them from taking a more assertive role. For example, many officers were told to stay out of the building because Chief Arredondo was inside a room with the attacker actively negotiating."